文章摘要
王 浩,卢守峰.基于演化博弈论的城市道路违章停车行为模型[J].交通运输研究,2020,6(4):102-108.
基于演化博弈论的城市道路违章停车行为模型
Illegal Parking Behavior Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 违章停车  演化博弈论  演化分析  演化稳定策略  复制动态
英文关键词: illegal parking  evolutionary game theory  evolutionary analysis  evolutionary stable strategy  replication dynamics
基金项目:
作者单位
王 浩 湖南省交通科学研究院有限公司 
卢守峰 长沙理工大学 交通运输工程学院 
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中文摘要:
      为减少城市道路违章停车,提升城市交通运行效率,运用演化博弈理论对城市道路违章停车行为进行研究。基于交通参与者有限理性原则,将违章停车问题中的机动车驾驶员与执法人员视为竞争者构建演化博弈模型,对参与人行为进行演化分析并对影响中心点的参数进行敏感性分析。研究结果表明:该演化博弈模型无稳定点,机动车驾驶员不违章停车的概率随执法人员执法概率的变化而变化。但各影响参数的影响速率不同,改变执法人员执法成本比改变执法人员执法获得的奖励对机动车驾驶员的不违章停车概率影响更大;改变机动车驾驶员不违章停车净损失比改变其违章停车受到的处罚对执法人员执法概率影响更大。因此,为改善违章停车现状,可优先从减少执法人员的执法成本、降低驾驶员不违章停车净损失方面着手。
英文摘要:
      In order to reduce urban illegal parking behaviors and improve the efficiency of urban traffic operation, the evolutionary game theory was used to study urban illegal parking behaviors. Based on the principle of traffic participants′ limited rationality, vehicle drivers and law enforcement personnel were regarded as competitors in illegal parking problem to establish evolutionary game model. Participants′ behaviors were analyzed by evolutionary theory. Sensitivity analysis was performed on the parameters affecting the central point. The research results show that the evolutionary game model doesn′t have stability point, and the probability of drivers′ non-violating parking change with the probability of law enforcement. However, different impact parameters have different impact rates. Changing the enforcement cost of law enforcement personnel has greater impact on the probability of vehicle drivers′ non-violating parking than changing the rewards obtained by law enforcement personnel. Changing the net loss of drivers′ non-violating parking has greater impact on the probability of law enforcement personnel′s task fulfiling than changing the penalty imposed on illegal parking. To improve the current situation of illegal parking, priority can be given from aspects of reducing the cost of law enforcement and the net loss of drivers′ non-violating parking.
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